Introduction
There is broad consensus among scientists that the climatic services, such as what the public might associate with local weather patterns, will change due to the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Action on a US climate policy, regardless of what it turns out to be, will not stop the change due to past activities. As a result, adaptation is now viewed as an important focus for new policies along with those aimed at reducing GHGs.
In these discussions, adaptation is described as the adjustments in natural or human systems that exploit the benefi cial opportunities and moderate the negative effects of any changes arising due to the altered climate system. 1 Several maintained assumptions are taken as given in nearly all discussions of climate adaptation. First, it is assumed that there is a key role for government and that anticipatory action is essential. Second, the discussions maintain that the experts know what to do. A mix of physical and natural infra-V. Kerry Smith is the Regents' Professor, W. P. Carey Professor of Economics, and Distinguished Sustainability Scientist at the Global Institute of Sustainability at Arizona State University; a university fellow at Resources for the Future; and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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This defi nition is consistent with what is used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
for natural climate conditions affect the value of climate mitigation. Borenstein (2005) makes a related point using a specifi c example-suggesting that dynamic pricing can increase the value of investments in residential solar power in some regions. This conclusion follows because the renewable power can displace the highest-cost substitute at exactly the times that power is needed.
The next section outlines an economic perspective on the reasons for intervention to promote climate adaptation and summarizes Carlton's (1977) version of a model to describe optimal pricing and capacity decisions with stochastic demand. The model is used as a template to consider two issues: (a) the effects of the conditions of access on the "ideal" pricing and capacity choices; and (b) the implications of alternative ways of characterizing climate services in models of the demands for substitutes.
Climate Adaptation Policies and Substitutes

Context
If the external conditions governing temperature and precipitation in a location change exogenously, we usually assume the people and fi rms affected by the change will adjust when it makes sense for them to do so. Of course, those involved have to be able to distinguish a permanent change from "normal" variability in their local environment. In the climate adaptation literature, these types of actions are labeled as autonomous adaptations (see Fankhauser, Smith, and Tol 1999) . Most climate policy recommendations call for anticipatory adaptation, which amounts to doing things in advance of the changes that are expected. Mendelsohn (2000) has questioned the need for these advance interventions. His arguments are the traditional ones we expect from economists. That is, if there is a market failure or incomplete information, then the fi rst best response is usually to correct the source of the failure. Actions taken assuming the failures will persist may be inefficient.
In the real world, some market failures are the result of practical compromises. Pricing policies for electricity and water refl ect past metering technologies (and are changing slowly) as well as the regulations governing the reliability of these services. For example, we realize that the incremental costs of delivering another kilowatt hour of power depends on the overall demands imposed from the full system of users at each time. These total demands vary with the location, the season, the days of the week, and the hours of the day. Initially it was impractical to have residential electric meters that provided this temporal resolution. In addition, meters had to be read by people.
Today it is not only possible to vary the recording systems for power, but the readings can be collected remotely. Usage could also be controlled remotely. Residential devices with these controls may well be cost-effective in many areas independent of whether the price schedules are changed or service is controlled remotely. The savings in manpower reading meters may be sufficient to justify the change.
This example helps to explain the source of a failure in pricing schemes. Initially, metering technology could not accommodate prices that adjusted to changes in the costs of service. In addition, the fi rms providing the service were regulated. To adjust prices in many areas, these fi rms must seek permission from a regulatory commission. This is broadly true for electricity and true in many areas for residential water supplies as well.
Firms providing these goods face uncertain demands and varying costs of meeting a reliability mandate. Current practice imposes the risks created by the differential costs of meeting varying system demands (and prices that don't readily adjust) on the suppliers. Signifi cant changes in either the variability of demand or the costs of providing service will alter the nature of these risks. Changes in local weather conditions due to climate change could be one source for such a shift. As a result, it may be efficient to reconsider the predefi ned pricing contracts and reliability mandates. To illustrate the economic rationale for this suggestion, the next section reviews a class of models that has been used to describe socially optimal pricing and capacity decisions under demand uncertainty. These models assume the social objective function is to maximize the expected consumer surplus from the service.
Pricing and Capacity Planning
Over forty years ago, a series of papers considered situations where a fi rm (or a stylized description of a policymaker) faced a stochastic demand and had to select the production capacity and a single price for output.
2 The intended application was to motivate a reconsideration of pricing policies for resources with these attributes. An important by-product of the research was a conclusion that these choices can depend on the conditions of access to the resource when demand exceeds capacity and prices do not adjust. My analysis begins with what I believe was the last major paper in this sequence of past research by Carlton (1977) . His model assumes the random component of demand scales the quantity demanded at each price. This paper fi nds that selecting a price and capacity to maximize expected consumer surplus would, under some conditions of access to the service, imply an "optimal" price above long-run marginal costs. The assumed terms of access when demand exceeds available capacity also affect the prospects for profi ts (or losses). Thus, they affect the need for taxes or subsidies to assure reliable provision of service.
Demand is a function of prices and defi ned as the product of two terms, x( p) and u. x( p) could be considered a per capita demand; p is the price of service; and u a positive, random variable with distribution function F(u). u could be interpreted as a measure of the number of customers. Capacity is planned as multiples of unit demand under "normal" conditions. Capacity is given by k = s · x( p). So when u > s, then with a fi xed price that is set in advance, not all customers can be served. Assuming p and s are selected before the size of u is known, then the policymaker must also consider rules to determine which consumers will have their demand satisfi ed.
Once decisions about capacity and price are made, the conditions of access (or rationing schemes) will infl uence what "counts" in defi ning the expected consumer surplus. Price does not play a role in clearing the market. Few markets allow instantaneous price adjustment. However, the assumption of no price adjustment is especially relevant to the issue of climate adaptation. This conclusion follows because climate's substitute services have historically been provided in situations with limited price adjustment. For example, consider the cases of "time of use" pricing or increasing price block structures for water. These policies do not allow prices to adjust as the amount demanded changes. Rather these structures amount to replacing constant prices with constant price schedules.
To illustrate the logic of the model, consider the simple graph presented in fi gure 14.1. Price is measured on the vertical axis and total quantity demanded on the horizontal. With multiplicative uncertainty, the variability in u pivots the demand function about the choke price, given by the point A. At the time s and p must be selected, the planner does not know what the aggregate demand will be. To begin this summary, consider fi rst the case of planning when efficient rationing is assumed to govern situations when demand exceeds available capacity. Three cases need to be distinguished to describe all possibilities: (a) demand matches exactly the planned capacity; in this case the diagram represents demand as s * · x( p); (b) demand is less than planned capacity or x( p) · u L in the fi gure, and (c) demand exceeds the planned capacity, given by x( p) · u h in the fi gure. If the value for the capacity that maximizes the expected surplus is s * multiples of demand at the optimal price of p, or s * x( p), then the realized consumer surplus is AD p. If we assume b is the constant (per unit), variable cost of producing the output, and β is the constant (per unit), long-run cost of capacity, then the need for a subsidy will depend on how revenue ( ps * x( p)) compares with bs * x( p) in the short run and (b + β)s * x( p) in the long run. The demand possibilities in fi gure 14.1, aside from the exact match with planned capacity, represent
) of an infi nite array of possible demands. The model assumes the policymaker focuses on the expected value of the aggregate consumer surplus net of costs. If demand is less than capacity (i.e.,
, at p, then consumer surplus will be AB p, and we consider
to determine the need for subsidies in the short run. The contribution to net benefi ts is the consumer surplus plus revenue,
) and fi xed costs (βsx( p)). At p, all consumers with willingness to pay represented along the demand curve from A to B want to consume the service, and there is sufficient capacity to accommodate them. Indeed, if the price could be adjusted, more users could be accommodated because aggregate demand is less than the capacity. When price effectively rations use, as it does in this example, then benefi ts are defi ned assuming those with highest willingness to pay are served fi rst. Other consumers are not "counted." At the selected price, p, they would not purchase the good.
The issue of other rationing schemes arises when the aggregate demand at the price, p, exceeds capacity. This is case (c). All the consumers represented along the demand curve x( p) · u h from A to E would be willing to pay at least p. However, only s * x( p) of this total demand can be served. Price does not screen out users consistent with the predefi ned capacity of s * x( p). If price cannot be raised, then someone must decide who among the consumers represented from A to E gets access to the service. Efficient rationing assumes those with the highest willingness to pay, or the segment from A to C, are the customers to be served. Random rationing assumes anyone from A to E has an equal chance of service.
The point of this earlier literature is to recognize that the defi nition for the access conditions, or the rationing rule when demand exceeds capacity, infl uences how the policymaker would select both the ex ante price and the amount of capacity. The rationing rules defi ne who "counts" in the objective function. Equations (1) and (2) specify the objective functions for these two cases (S E for the expected surplus with efficient rationing and S R for random rationing).
(1)
In these specifi cations, x -1 (q) is the inverse demand function for x( p) with q the quantity demanded at a price of p (i.e., q = x( p)). Both objective functions describe ex ante choices of p and s. As such, they describe what counts when demand is less than sx( p) and when it exceeds sx( p) for every possible value of p and s, the choice variables. Equation (1) could be written more compactly. This more detailed form is used because it helps to illustrate the issues to be considered in extending the model to include a natural supply.
The fi rst term in equation (1) provides the contribution to expected surplus if demand is less than selected capacity at any selected price. The second term overstates the contribution to expected surplus for demand in excess of capacity. In terms of fi gure 14.1 it would count all of the surplus along the demand to point E. In fact, at p only s * x( p) units of demand can be served. So we need two corrections that are represented in the third term. First, we remove the extra surplus (illustrated by s * x( p)CEx( p)u h in fi gure 14.1) and correct the variable cost embedded in the second term. The term, (1 -s/ u)bx( p), removes the cost used in the second term and includes variable cost for only those units actually sold, bsx( p). As the more compact version of the objective function in equation (2) illustrates, this amount is all that can be counted for a capacity price selection with random rationing. Moreover, in this case, we attach to each unit of consumption the "average" surplus over the full range of users that would "like to" have the ability to use the service at price p. The last term in equations (1) and (2) is the cost of a selected capacity. This long-run cost does not change with the rationing schemes. Table 14 .1 summarizes the implications for capacity and price selections under the two objective functions and rationing schemes. The capacity/ price pair for the objective function associated with efficient rationing summarizes the results from Brown and Johnson (1969;  with a somewhat different specifi cation for capacity) and those for random rationing are taken from Carlton (1977) . Clearly, the selection of an "optimal" price ( p) and capacity (s) pair depends on how access conditions are determined in periods of excess demand.
It is not easy to compare the capacity choices under efficient and random rationing. Direct results depend on what we assume for x( p) and F(u). s is defi ned implicitly by equality between the truncated expected consumer surplus of the marginal user who is not served (less corresponding operating costs), (∫ s
) and the marginal capacity cost. With random rationing, capacity depends on the relative size of consumer surplus per unit demanded net of both unit variable and capacity costs compared to consumer surplus per unit net of the variable cost. With efficient rationing, prices would be set below long-run marginal costs, while with random rationing, they would be greater than long-run marginal costs.
Adding Natural Supply
To relate these results to incentive-based policies for climate adaptation, we need to describe how the private goods substitute for climate services. Assume, for simplicity, that x is a perfect substitute for some climate service. If the level of natural service provided by climate is initially η, then each person's demand for a substitute is conditional to the amount of η available. If η represents the aggregate services to everyone, and climate change eliminates these natural services, then the market demand for the substitute would shift out by η (parallel to x( p) · u). If we assume natural services are specifi c to each individual user, then (x( p) -η)u is the market demand. In this case, natural supply reduces needs for x but could accentuate the variability in the aggregate demand for x. The introduction of these natural services into the formal model in the simplest case (where natural supply affects aggregate demand) is similar to adding natural capacity. It infl uences how we defi ne excess demand (the upper limits of the fi rst integral and the lower limit of the second and third in equation (1) and in a similar fashion 
Notes: These results are derived maximizing expected consumer surplus using equations (1) and (2) in the text; F -1 (.) refers to the inverse of the distribution function F(u); p is defi ned implicitly based as the price required to assure the unit quantity demand would equal the proportional reduction required so that ux( p) = sx(p).
the two integrals in equation [2] ). As a result, it infl uences the effects of assumptions about rationing. 3 The natural supply would not infl uence the cost of the substitutes. Nonetheless, the comparison of price and capacity choices with the two rationing schemes would be altered.
Relaxing the assumption of perfect substitution between x and η is another variation that would further change the results. Alternatively, we could also assume the amount natural services affect the unit demands for x. This formulation would change the slope and position of x( p). Finally, we could assume that u and η are not independent random variables. In this case, a joint distribution for these two random variables needs to be defi ned, and the problem becomes more complex.
One does not need to display all the algebra for these cases to conclude that pricing and capacity decisions would change in all of them. Thus, regardless of how we treat natural supply, anticipatory adaptation must consider both the pricing and the conditions of access to services provided by the planned substitutes for climate services at the same time as capacity planning takes place.
The incremental value of policies that would alter natural capacity also depends on adaptation policy. Access conditions determine the value of capacity as demonstrated in table 14.1. The lesson from this algebra is adaptation planning will implicitly (or explicitly) incorporate rules for allocating supply when all cannot be served. With a permanent change in the climate regime at some locations, these allocation rules serve to redefi ne reliability conditions for the substitute services. A more direct way of providing incentives to substitute for productive capacity would be by using pricing schemes that share the risks between suppliers and demanders of these substitutes. These price structures can also be described as methods for including the reliability of service as part of a nonlinear price schedule. In the model, these possibilities are represented through the rationing alternatives. In a more realistic setting, consumers would select among plans for service that defi ne prices and the ability of a centralized control to remove service at particular intervals. These terms could vary with season, time of day, or whatever. They might be more complex for some substitutes than others.
Today, they are feasible policy alternatives due to the changes in our ability to meter and inform consumers of their patterns of use. It is certainly possible to envision a consumer-friendly device that would track the changes in usage and switch off electric appliances (i.e., heat pumps, refrigerators, and so forth) for short periods. It is also possible to envision remote systems a consumer might use to monitor home usage and conditions. In the case of water as a substitute for climate services, this type of continuous adjustment seems unlikely. Nonetheless, price signals that varied by season and 238 V. Kerry Smith year based on climate along with decentralized storage could be options that policymakers and customers might consider.
Weather and Water
Climate change will alter local weather conditions. People and fi rms adjust by using substitutes. This chapter's analysis of this process envisioned changes to a system that already acknowledged stochastic demand for these substitutes and pricing conventions that do not allow markets to alter prices as the demand-supply imbalance changes. As a result, the effects of new uncertainties on this system and the design of revised policies depend upon what is assumed about the interrelationships between uncertainties in the supplies of climate services and the stochastic demand for substitutes. Can we treat the two as approximately independent? Or are there reasons to believe the demand for substitutes changes when the natural services they displace are also more variable? The previous section posed these as alternative model specifi cations.
A detailed answer for the cases of electricity and water is not possible. It is difficult to estimate the demands for these substitute goods under any set of conditions. This task is confounded by a variety of issues: increasing block rate pricing structures, limited price variation, incomplete metering of use (especially for outdoor uses in the case of water), and a variety of other challenges. Instead, this section summarizes some recent empirical research on residential water demand in the urban Southwest that suggests independence would not be a good assumption. It suggests that the nature of the residential demand for water changes with seasonal levels of precipitation. As a result, models that treat the uncertainty in water demand and the response of water consumed to price as independent of the uncertainty in the climate system would understate the complexity of the problem. Table 14 .2 summarizes some of the estimates for the price elasticity of demand for water by residential users in Phoenix taken from Klaiber et al. (2010) . These results were developed by exploiting two types of changes in water prices for Phoenix households. In each of these years, the Phoenix water department varied residential water customers' rates between winter and summer. There was also a gradual transition in marginal prices and a change in the threshold consumption level (in the block structure) for higher marginal prices from 600 to 1,000 cubic feet consumed between winter and summer. Finally, over time, the level of the marginal prices by block and month also changed to refl ect cost increases.
The estimation strategy matched records by month for years experiencing cost increases and evaluated the change in the quantity thresholds that defi ne the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles for residential customers in each census block group served by the Phoenix water department. Summer and winter months were considered separately. As a result, each consumption group did not move between the blocks associated with dif-ferent marginal prices. Thus, the endogeneity of price due to "choosing" a consumption block does not need to be considered. The customers in each consumption group experienced the same price change due to changes in the rates for each block over time. 4 The effects of natural supply variability can be seen through the difference in price elasticity estimates implied for different pairings of the years used in the models. Consumption in 2000 is compared with 2002 and 2003 in forming the quantity differences used to estimate the fi rst difference model. The average annual precipitation (as well as in average days with measurable rain) in 2002 was less than half the level experienced in 2000 and 2003. The estimates for price elasticities in winter and summer indicate quite distinct changes when pairing two normal years as compared to the pairing of a normal and a dry year. 5 For the normal/ dry combination, summer demand is much less responsive to price changes compared to the estimates derived Table 14.2 Price elasticity for residential water demand of the system to meet households' needs with variation in long-run natural conditions. 7 Some types of demand are reduced or displaced. As a result, a smaller capacity can meet the revised demand pattern with less likelihood of shortfalls. This interpretation is commonly used in the demand response literature associated with pricing schemes for electricity. It has not been connected in formal models with discussions of climate adaptation. 8 This chapter has used the early literature on pricing and capacity decisions in the presence of demand uncertainty to describe how an economic analysis of capacity planning, as a response to climate change, cannot be undertaken independent of considering how substitute services are priced. In addition, with infl exible prices, the rules used to determine who is served when demand exceeds supply will be important to both capacity and price choices. Considering the design of price schedules as part of anticipatory adaptation would imply that prices for a wide range of activities serving as substitutes for climate services might be considered. These types of changes offer the potential to create incentives that can feed back to infl uence both the pace of climate change and the demands for the services facilitating adaptation.
